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The legal bases on which asylum cases are decided in the UK are the designated 
Country Guidance (CG) cases. Whenever a new CG case is agreed, it changes the 
ways in which lawyers, civil servants, country experts and even applicants behave in 
preparing arguments for asylum claims. This essay examines how this process has 
influenced the experiences of country experts (including myself) advising on 
Zimbabwean asylum cases in the UK. It illustrates how there is a dynamic 
relationship between country expert advice and CG cases, which leads to some forms 
of expertise being more in demand than others, and militates against the ‘objective’ 
knowledge that ostensibly informs tribunal decisions.1 
Country Guidance 
Country Guidance cases, in the words of Robert Thomas, ‘provide decision-makers 
with generic guidance as to whether or not country conditions are such that they will 
generate a risk on return for broad categories of applicant’.2 CG cases are picked from 
those in train in the asylum process, as being in some way representative of a large 
number of comparable cases. Their determination identifies generic categories of risk 
and/or categories of person at risk, which are likely to recur regularly in the UK 
asylum process; and it recommends how these should be treated. This assists in 
ensuring some consistency in decision-making across the various tribunals.  
 
However, as Thomas points out, ‘Good country guidance presupposes good country 
information.’3 The purpose of the CG hearing is to establish the current situation on 
the ground: its role is more inquisitorial than adversarial. Yet one of the most striking 
oddities about the CG system is that the tribunal is treated as a standard asylum 
hearing, based on the adversarial framework of Home Office versus appellant, battling 
it out in front of the tribunal adjudicator. Within this framework, country experts are 
almost exclusively commissioned by appellants – as, indeed, is the case for all 
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standard asylum hearings, too. Even though country experts recognise that their duty 
is to the courts, their evidence has already been framed by the issues that the 
appellant’s lawyers have asked them to address. The position of the Home Office 
emerges largely from challenging the appellant’s case, rather than from 
commissioning alternative reports. The tribunal, meanwhile, has no powers to 
commission experts of its own.  
 
Another quirk of the CG system, which influences the work of country experts in the 
standard asylum cases, is that a CG ruling stands until challenges lead to a new CG 
ruling being made. In Zimbabwe asylum cases, this has routinely led lawyers to ask 
country experts to comment on the current CG case and on whether the situation on 
the ground has transformed since then. As Thomas observes: 
the Tribunal produced country guidance on the situation in 
Zimbabwe in July 2007 on the basis of evidence about conditions in 
that country largely concerning the previous two years or so before 
then. Conditions in Zimbabwe subsequently deteriorated swiftly.4 
As well as creating what Thomas describes as an ‘air of unreality’, this situation also 
ensures that country experts tend to be very familiar with the details of the CG 
guidance – sometimes more so that the lawyers, who may not routinely deal with 
cases from Zimbabwe. Where the CG case is favourable to appellants (as many of the 
Zimbabwe CG cases have been), country experts are encouraged to use it in support 
of their reports; where it is unfavourable, they are encouraged to treat it as part of the 
adversarial system, more than as an ‘objective’ assessment of the situation on the 
ground. 
 
So, despite their merits, Country Guidance cases have unintended consequences in 
their influence on the processes of the asylum system. The issues highlighted in CG 
cases determine the questions asked in standard applications for asylum, the nature of 
evidence adduced and even the behaviour of applicants prior to putting in an 
application. The CG cases may be regarded as providing a ‘checklist’ of factors that 
claimants have to meet, rather than a description of potential risk factors. This leads, 
as Thomas notes, to ‘the risk that appellants might be tempted to tailor their stories to 
factors regarded as relevant.’5 Within the UK, we repeatedly hear that Zimbabwean 
asylum seekers attempt to build up a suitable ‘CG’ profile, for example by becoming 
politically active within the UK branch of the main Zimbabwean opposition party, 
before putting in an application for asylum or pursuing an appeal.6 While it is 
impossible to prove such rumours, the very fact of their existence illustrates the 
                                                 
4 Thomas, ‘Consistency’: 522 
5 Thomas, ‘Consistency’: 516 
6 This claim appears with some frequency in the UKBA’s ‘Reasons for Refusal’ letters, issued to 
asylum seekers from Zimbabwe who are deemed not to be ‘genuine’ political activists. It was also 
mentioned to me as a possibility by the deputy UKBA Migration Officer at the British Embassy in 
Harare. 
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impact that CG cases have on grassroots understanding of what is required to win an 
asylum application or appeal. 
 
This distorting effect is not unique to the UK. Dr Lynette Jackson, Associate 
Professor in African History, Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of 
Illinois Chicago, told me that, since 2006, she has been routinely asked to comment 
on the risks of female genital mutilation (FGM) to African women seeking asylum in 
the US. This happens even when the women have already been ‘circumcised’ or 
when, by comparison with the risks posed to them on account of their political 
activism, they are at negligible risk from FGM. This is apparently because of US 
Court ruling in January 2006 that recognised ‘fear of FGM’ as a ‘well-founded fear’ 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention, leading lawyers to regard FGM as a case-
winning issue.  
 
Clearly, then, CG cases influence a range of behaviours within the asylum system. 
This essay will focus specifically on how CG cases have affected the experiences of 
country experts working on Zimbabwe. It is informed largely by my own decade-long 
experience of writing country expert reports in Zimbabwe asylum cases, 
supplemented by interviews with other colleagues also working in this field. 
 
Country Experts 
It is not always easy to find country experts. A basic limitation is that not many 
people have a suitable range of expertise to comment effectively on asylum cases. For 
example, Dr Oliver Phillips, Reader in Law at the University of Westminster, has 
offered country expert advice both in routine asylum cases and in the recent ‘LZ’ 
Country Guidance regarding the risks to people in Zimbabwe on the basis of their 
sexuality.7 He observed that there are very few experts in the UK able to comment on 
LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual) issues in southern Africa: he could not, 
for example, think of a comparable expert in the UK who might comment on the 
situation in South Africa.  
 
Moreover, the adversarial nature of the asylum process acts as a disincentive to 
experts. The issues here are both ontological and reputational. On the one hand, as 
Good has illustrated, the legal system places different meanings on concepts of ‘truth’ 
and ‘fact’ and the distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ perception from the 
meanings of these ideas within academia. Academics are not good in contexts that 
require ‘yes/no’ answers: 
Lawyers take the notion of ‘fact’ as philosophically unproblematic, 
and are concerned with determining which general principles (laws) 
these facts call into play. Anthropologists are more aware…of the 
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problems of obtaining and using data, and less inclined to talk of 
‘facts’ without hedging the notion around with qualifications.8 
In an adversarial context, such equivocation appears to suggest a lack of reliability or 
trustworthiness: this is not a pleasant experience for the conscientious academic.  
 
Furthermore, it is the role of both the Home Office and the adjudicator to exercise 
scepticism towards the claims of asylum seekers (although the adjudicator has a duty 
to err towards a finding of credibility, where lives are at risk). They are, therefore, 
equally wary of the claims of experts giving testimony on behalf of claimants.9 In 
offering their expert advice, country experts are exposing themselves to the risk of 
being deemed partisan, insufficiently expert or merely irrelevant. This is within a 
context where their academic judgement is necessarily going to be subject to robust 
scrutiny, if not outright attack, based on a different set of criteria from those used 
within academia. For example, in 2007, Professor Terence Ranger, the extremely 
eminent Emeritus Professor of Race Relations from Oxford University, who is one of 
the world’s most respected experts on Zimbabwe, was roundly attacked in the 
findings of the ‘HS’ country guidance case: 
117. One has to look very hard at the professor's evidence to find 
upon what, other than his own assessment of the conduct of the 
authorities generally, he bases the view expressed in the final 
sentence of the extract of his report reproduced above. It is notable 
that elsewhere he refers to sources, but here he does not. We are, 
therefore, at this point dependant only upon his unsupported opinion 
which, as an expert witness, he is entitled to express. But, it is for the 
Tribunal to decide what weight to give to that in the context of the 
evidence before us as a whole. 
118. In his conclusions in his recent written report he said that more 
and more Zimbabweans have been defined as traitors, particularly 
those with British connections. In his oral evidence he said anyone 
identified as a failed asylum seeker would be regarded as connected 
to Britain, and so regarded as a traitor and an enemy … This is not 
evidence of what has happened to failed asylum seekers or how they 
are regarded by the authorities on return to Zimbabwe. This is the 
professor's view of how they would be regarded.10 
It is not surprising that many academics, particularly those with partisan views that 
might creep into their reports, feel that their reputations are vulnerable within the 
                                                 
8 Antony Good, ‘“Undoubtedly an Expert?” Anthropologists in British Asylum Courts’, Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, vol 10, no 1, March 2004:130.  
See also Robert Thomas, ‘Report on a Roundtable Seminar: Asylum Adjudication and Country 
Guidance. Function, Operation and Future’, International Journal of Refugee Law, vol 22, no 2, 2010: 
337-8. 
9 Robert Thomas, ‘Assessing the credibility of asylum claims: EU and UK approaches examined,’ 
European Journal of Migration and Law, vol 8, 2006: 86. 
10 HS (returning asylum seekers) Zimbabwe CG [2007] UKAIT 00094, 29 November 2007, §117-118 
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adversarial system, and decline to participate.11 Others are more sanguine. One 
country expert on Zimbabwe, who wished to remain anonymous in case his comments 
here were used to discredit his reports in court, remarked that, ‘the asylum system as a 
whole is necessarily flawed. I am not that concerned about [my] credibility vis-à-vis 
the asylum system, given that that system's flaws are so self-evident.’ 
 
Clearly, suspicions of partisanship are exacerbated by the system itself. Inherent in the 
adversarial system is the temptation for lawyers to put pressure on country experts to 
be, in Phillips’ phrase, ‘less tempered, less reserved in my accounts’: for example, by 
suggesting he use the word ‘persecution’ rather than the more measured ‘abuse’ or 
‘discrimination’. But, even without these pressures, most academics who have 
devoted their careers to the study of a country, being subject to the ties of friendship 
and often kinship, are likely to have a degree of partisanship regarding events within 
that country. Miles Blessings-Tendi, who provided country expert reports while 
writing his doctoral thesis in Oxford, admitted that he was more interested in 
presenting his analysis of the nature of politics within the state, than in engaging with 
the specifics of each asylum claim. Stephen Chan, Professor of International Relations 
at the School of Oriental and African Studies in Oxford stated that he provided expert 
reports to support appellants’ cases because ‘I saw great merit in retaining the 
Zimbabwean diaspora in the UK because of the benefits of remittances to Zimbabwe.’ 
As CG rulings made it easier to claim asylum successfully in the UK, Chan felt that 
there were too many unfounded and opportunistic claims. He stopped providing 
country expert reports and has instead ‘been lobbying government to go slow on its 
returns policy, precisely on the grounds of the remittance economy and its role in 
financing core MDC communities in Zimbabwe.’ Chan’s openness about his own 
political positioning demonstrates how difficult it is to put personal relationships and 
politics to one side in writing country expert reports. 
 
Even beyond these systemic difficulties, the political pressures in Zimbabwean 
asylum cases are complex and country experts have found themselves caught between 
conflicting accusations of bias. On the one hand, the Foreign Office maintained a 
steady hostility towards the Zanu-PF government throughout most of the 2000s; it 
was loud on the international stage in support of sanctions against members of the 
Zanu-PF elite, as a response to allegations of human rights abuses in the country. On 
the other hand, the UKBA, aware of populist concern about immigration, was anxious 
to limit the number of Zimbabweans claiming asylum in the UK. The Zimbabwean 
situation, perhaps more than any other, saw Country Guidance rulings swing 
dramatically from one side of the permissive spectrum to the other, as challenges to 
rulings followed each other thick and fast. Country experts and the Tribunal were both 
caught in between, trying to explain and make rulings on a complex situation, while 
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both the Home Office and the Foreign Office wanted simple headlines in support of 
their policies.12 Understandably, country experts were often reluctant to be embroiled 
in this political dispute. 
 
Country experts are also constrained by clear limits to the type of advice that they can 
provide. In Zimbabwean cases, it is very difficult to authenticate documentation, for 
example. During the 2000s, with rapidly-declining economic conditions, it was 
impossible for any organisation to maintain consistency in its documentation: there 
were shortages of paper, ink and design materials. Although I could confirm that, for 
example, an MDC membership card looked like others I had seen, this was no 
guarantee of authenticity: anyone could reproduce the cheaply-made cards. So I 
preferred to say nothing. 
 
Other experts with whom I spoke admitted that they, too, had difficulty with requests 
to authenticate documents. Both Chenjerai Shire, a linguist at the School of Oriental 
& African Studies in London, and Steve Kibble, Policy and Advocacy Officer for the 
London-based Progressio charity, stated that were willing to say that documents such 
as membership cards, birth certificates or police dockets looked like others they had 
seen, but no more. Stephen Chan and Oliver Phillips felt better placed to authenticate 
some types of materials. Chan had been in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe during the transition, 
and then providing training in new government ministries in the early 1980s. So, as he 
says, ‘I came across a lot of paperwork.’ Based on this knowledge, he felt able to use 
a form of words along the lines of ‘This follows the template for such documents…’. 
However, even Chan was reluctant to comment on the provenance of documents only 
supplied to him in the form of faxed or photocopied reproductions, and there were 
cases, such as over the authenticity of a Malawian passport, where he declined to 
comment. He agreed that it was not possible to comment on MDC cards, which 
changed frequently and were at times locally-issued according to local designs.  
 
Oliver Phillips, on the other hand, has developed some expertise in authentication of 
particular types of document. It started with criminal justice documents (dockets, 
police records, extracts from court rulings, summonses, arrest warrants), with which 
he was very familiar from his research. This quickly led on to requests for all kinds of 
other documents. As he had access to birth and death certificates for personal reasons, 
he also felt able to comment on these. Even in these cases, however, the changing 
types of paper, ink and typesetting during the period of acute economic crisis posed 
challenges. Recently, he appeared in person at a case in Sheffield, where there were 
two conflicting sets of seemingly-legitimate official documents; one set asserted that a 
man had a criminal record, the other set asserted that he did not. Phillips was able to 
look at the documentation in the round, drawing on a range of detailed local 
knowledge regarding the courts from which the documents emanated (their 
jurisdiction, geographic reach and the types of cases with which they dealt); the type 
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of fax machines used and the difficulties in accessing working fax machines during 
office hours; and the form of wording used. Even so, it took the court an entire day to 
reconstruct which set of documents was likely to be genuine. 
 
Given the vulnerability to reputational damage that the country expert system creates, 
most country experts are very reluctant to testify outside their specific area of 
expertise. Oliver Phillips, despite extensive knowledge of the political situation in 
Zimbabwe, was very precise about the types of cases he is willing to take on (LGBT 
issues, HIV-related cases and cases using his knowledge of the Zimbabwean legal 
system). Those who stray outside their specific expertise not only risk damaging their 
own reputations, but they undermine the system as a whole. For example, I have had a 
case referred to me on second appeal, where the initial country expert report on 
Zimbabwe had been commissioned from a Namibian expert. The report, while 
extremely lengthy, lacked authority, failed to identify the key issues at stake in the 
case and, being based largely on reports from partisan sources, seemed to confirm the 
suspicion that country experts are not impartial. 
 
This experience highlights one of the most important roles of the country expert. 
While any good researcher will be able to glean factual information from the wealth 
of material available in the public sphere, the meaning and interpretation of that data 
may not be clear without local knowledge: ‘it is precisely in the assessment and 
interpretation of the cultural and political significance of such facts that country 
expertise comes into play.’13 The role of the country expert is not to assess the 
credibility of an appellant, but to explain fully the context within which the 
appellant’s claim should be understood. Often, this involves explaining that 
something which seems to undermine credibility, such as travelling on false 
documents, may actually be adduced as evidence of the plausibility of the claim.14 
Sometimes, it involves explaining complex anthropological details such as the nature 
of marriage or the appropriate guardianship of children. Frequently, in the 
Zimbabwean context, it involves clarifying the specific nature of political violence, 
and the role of state within that. But, regardless of the importance of country expertise 
in unravelling these cultural and contextual issues, the CG cases still tend to provide 
the framework within which these details must be explained. 
 
Sources of information 
The case of the Namibian ‘expert’ also highlights the thorny issue of the nature of the 
sources on which country experts might draw in producing their reports. At a training 
courses for lawyers dealing with immigration issues, run by HJT Training in March 
2007, both legal specialists and country experts emphasized that the adjudicators 
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expect the content of country experts’ reports to be supported by and revolve around 
material published in the public sphere, rather than based on personal experience. 
Several of us commented on the irony that material in the public sphere was 
frequently partisan, based on the interests of expatriate exiles; and likely to be more 
partisan than the inadmissible anecdotal material we garnered as country experts 
while visiting the country itself. In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, much of the 
evidence on human rights abuses is published in the openly oppositional, and 
sometimes unreliable, expatriate media, such as Voice of America, or the London-
based SW Radio Africa and The Zimbabwean newspaper. Nonetheless, as with the 
Country of Origin Information reports compiled by UKBA, published material is 
regarded by tribunals as ‘legitimate’ in a way that more informal sources of 
information are not. 
 
Notwithstanding this principle, in most reports a significant contribution comes from 
the evidence of human rights organisations and NGOs working in the region. The 
British Ambassador in Harare also observed to me that the Embassy feeds reports on 
the state of human rights in Zimbabwe back to London based on information garnered 
from local NGOs.  Analysis and information from local NGOs may be posted online 
even when not given general publication release and is generally accepted as 
permissible evidence in the public sphere. As Steve Kibble observed to me, 
Zimbabwe is very well documented regarding collection of human rights abuse data: 
much more than most other African states.  
 
This makes the work of country experts much easier in some ways; but it has pitfalls. 
NGOs and human rights organisations tend to have a vested interest in maintaining 
donors’ belief in a chronic or severe situation that needs continual funding. This does 
not necessarily lead to exorbitant claims about abuse. Phillips, for example, 
commented that the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe organisation (GALZ) has no 
vested interest in over-emphasizing levels of sexuality-based violence: somewhat to 
the dismay of UK lawyers trying to garner evidence that their gay clients would 
necessarily be at risk if returned to Zimbabwe.  
 
Nonetheless, there is an understandable tendency for locally-based human rights 
organisations to present the situation in Zimbabwe as consistently dire. Moreover, as 
Kibble observed, there is an accompanying tendency in the UK, particularly in media 
and social networking circles, to lionise Zimbabwean NGOs. Their reports are 
received as evidence of a triumphant resistance in the face of a repressive state that 
tries to limit the flow of information. Consequently, the reports are rarely given much 
critical treatment in UK: they are circulated and reproduced freely, without scrutiny. 
In South Africa, by contrast, there is some irritation with Zimbabwean NGOs, given 
their tendency to seek approval from EU- and US-based organisations, rather than 
engaging with the other rights-oriented NGOs in the region. Kibble suggested that 
country experts should cross-check material coming out of Zimbabwean NGOs 
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against reports produced by regional NGOs. The latter tend to have a more coherent 
and less strident way of analysing the situation in Zimbabwe. 
 
The country expert system does not formally recognise the difference between expert 
advice from someone who is regularly in the region and someone, however expert, 
whose information is primarily received through news agencies and human rights 
organisations. As Good comments, absence from the region is not necessarily 
indicative of lesser expertise.15 Nonetheless, there is a sense that country experts can 
lose a full perspective because they are based in the UK. In discussing the perception 
of country expert reports as partisan, Thomas notes that the higher courts have 
exhorted the Home Office to balance country expert reports with information from 
officials posted at diplomatic and consular posts. The importance of actually being 
based in the country is explicit in this suggestion: ‘such information is produced by a 
diplomatic post with a permanent presence in the country concerned, as opposed to 
the temporary presence of a country expert.’16  
 
All the country experts with whom I spoke emphasized the value of local informants, 
even though it was problematic to cite them in reports. Phillips stated that he consults 
regularly with lawyers in Zimbabwe regarding procedural issues when he needs 
clarification, but he will be open about such consultation in his reports. Kibble, 
however, noted that a reliance on local informants may be seen as evidence of 
partisanship, even though he acknowledged that he occasionally refers issues to two 
regionally-based oppositional academics, Brian Raftopoulos and Lloyd Sachikonye. I 
have on occasion sought specific information from local networks about specific 
claims (such as confirmation of the existence of a named farm and farmer), and 
explained my reasons for doing so in my report.  
 
Interestingly, Stephen Chan, stated that in many of his reports, his sources of evidence 
were not only unpublished and based on local informants, but also anonymous. This is 
because he had been dealing with very specific types of cases: members of the armed 
forces who could not demonstrate grounds for asylum on the basis of political, 
religious or ethnic affiliations, but who were claiming exceptional leave to remain on 
humanitarian grounds. These claimants argued that they would suffer ‘additional 
hazard’ if returned to Zimbabwe, being at risk of court martial for desertion and being 
particularly vulnerable because they would be traced on return, as their identities were 
well documented by the state and security services. There was no need for such 
claimants to demonstrate sympathies with the opposition; the majority of cases were 
based on desertion from the army during the war in the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Prof Chan’s advice was based on the 
observation that published evidence of ‘additional hazard’ was effectively impossible 
to obtain, because courts martial and other disciplinary cases were not recorded in the 
public domain. Moreover, those who had relevant information were not willing – or 
even safe – to be publically identified. And so Chan’s evidence was based on 
unnamed government and military sources in the region. Nonetheless, he was able to 
argue that certain sentences would follow from certain conditions, such as desertion, 
and to muster evidence on the appalling conditions in military prisons; put together, 
he argued, these created a weight of evidence in favour of the appellant. 
 
There is, then, a strong sense that local knowledge, garnered from informants in the 
region, is invaluable. Steve Kibble noted how his reports are regularly replenished and 
refreshed by personal contacts, in an ongoing conversation. Sometimes these oral 
sources derive from visits to the region; at other times they come from NGO/human 
rights delegations to the Zimbabwe Europe Network, which Kibble chairs. This direct 
conversation inspires useful thoughts and perspectives, giving expert advice an 
underlying authority, even though it cannot provide data deemed as objective 
evidence by a tribunal. Kibble observed that, as the time since he has had direct 
contact with informants in/from the region lengthens, his reports become more based 
upon press reports and the published record; the authority derived from regionally-
based insights accordingly diminishes.  
 
Overall, then, sources of information for country expert reports are fairly tightly 
constrained. There is a consistent reliance on the output of human rights organisations 
and NGOs. However, other forms of invaluable local knowledge may be deemed 
inadmissible for various reasons. The evident changes in the content of reports about 
Zimbabwe over the past decade has not, then, been driven by changing sources of 
information – although the growing access to online newspapers has certainly made 
the job easier – but rather, by changing priorities established in the country guidance 
rulings. 
 
Country Experts and Country Guidance: a dynamic relationship 
As noted above, except in very specific circumstances, country experts are instructed 
by the lawyers representing the asylum seeker, and are asked to provide information 
that will assist the court in making a decision. In most cases, the hearing is an appeal. 
The appellant will already have applied for asylum and been refused, receiving notice 
of refusal alongside a lengthy ‘Reasons for Refusal’. Normally, the lawyer will ask 
the country expert to comment on the Reasons for Refusal, as well as raising specific 
questions about their client’s claim. All the country experts with whom I spoke agreed 
that, these days, the request will normally be accompanied by extensive 
documentation, which will always include the appellant’s original witness statement, 
generally supplemented by a further statement in response to the Reasons for Refusal. 
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Clearly, the briefing of country experts has improved since the situation described by 
Antony Good in 2004, when he commented that: 
the 'instructions' from many solicitors, often the very ones with the 
tightest deadlines, consist merely of a request to prepare a report, 
with no indication of what issues to cover.17 
Good further noted that the expert is often not well briefed on guidance on what is or 
is not permissible, which may cause difficulties because, in general, country experts 
are ‘unaware of the precise legal status of their own evidence.’  
 
The role of the expert advisor is very tightly constrained: our duty is to the court, not 
to the lawyer who commissioned the report. We are not being asked to comment on 
whether the asylum applicant’s claims are credible; merely whether they are plausible. 
It is the role of the adjudicator to decide on the credibility of the witness. Nonetheless, 
the questions that country experts are asked to address are manifestly influenced by 
the current CG rulings and, because they are posed by the appellant’s solicitor, are 
generally intended to indicate that the appellant is at risk, under the categories of risk 
or person defined by the current CG case. So the nature of the evidence is routinely 
oriented towards that outcome, regardless of the care that the country expert takes to 
remain non-partisan. 
 
The nature of the reports that are required from Zimbabwe experts has changed 
noticeably over the years. Initially, prior to the development of country guidance on 
Zimbabwe, these changes were driven partly by changes within Zimbabwe itself and 
partly by UK immigration policy. So Oliver Phillips observed that from 1995-97, he 
was generally asked to comment on claims for asylum based on sexual orientation. 
Very soon thereafter, however, these cases were displaced by claims for exceptional 
leave to remain, based on the lack of treatment for HIV+/AIDS. The cases of HIV 
infection in Zimbabwe increased very rapidly after 2002. However, around the same 
time, the need for effective HIV treatment was excluded, in isolation, as adequate 
grounds for discretionary leave to remain in UK. Phillips noticed that lawyers stopped 
asking for details of treatment options in Zimbabwe (somewhat to his relief, as ‘it was 
such a pig to research’.) He states that he hasn’t had an HIV case in years. Instead, all 
of the cases on which he’s been asked to comment over the past five to seven years 
have been about sexual orientation. There have been increasing numbers of claims 
from women, perhaps because it seems easier to prove persecution of lesbians. It also 
seems to Phillips that there is a decreasing number of cases that strike him as factually 
dubious. This probably reflects the decreasing number of economic migrants, as the 
Zimbabwean economy begins to recover from the period of stratospheric inflation. 
 
For those of us offering expert advice on politics, the first barrage of applications 
came soon after the 2002 Presidential elections. Prior to that point, many of those 
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leaving Zimbabwe had been white farmers and their families, who could claim British 
citizenship in some way, and so did not need to apply for asylum. The increased 
political violence during and after the closely-contested 2002 Presidential election, 
combined with worsening economic conditions, led to a steadily and steeply 
increasing number of Zimbabweans coming to the UK to claim asylum. The Home 
Office was required to winnow out the economic migrants from those with genuine 
asylum claims, or human rights grounds to be given leave to remain in the UK. The 
civil servants working on these cases were under great pressure to refuse as many 
applications as they could, given growing political hostility towards ‘asylum seekers’ 
in the popular press – often used as a synonym for ‘illegal immigrant’. Their hastily-
judged refusals led to an avalanche of appeals. 
 
For a country expert, this initial spate of appeals in 2002 required a fairly uniform 
type of response. Appeals revolved around the Reasons for Refusal and the extent and 
location of the political violence. My expert reports were filled with minutiae of dates 
and events: was it likely that this person could have been attacked in this way, at that 
location, at a particular time? Was it possible that a person threatened in Kariba could 
be traced and attacked in Epworth? Each report required a detailed and expert 
knowledge of specific constituencies and the patterns of violence associated with 
them.  
 
It was striking how some of the arguments in the Reasons for Refusal verged on the 
absurd, apparently barrel-scraping in an attempt to find some reason to turn an 
application down. For example, in one case, a man from Harare, the capital city, was 
turned down because he was not ‘really’ an opposition activist, on the grounds that he 
did not know the address of the MDC offices in Bulawayo. An equivalent argument in 
the UK would be that someone claiming to be a rank-and-file Labour Party activist 
from London was not telling the truth, because he did not know the address of the 
Labour Party offices in Cardiff.  
 
The process lacked robustness; decisions were made on the basis of inadequate or 
inaccurate data. Applicants were questioned about their knowledge of MDC policies 
and personalities; on many occasions, the applicants’ knowledge exceeded that of the 
Home Office. In particular, the Home Office list of MDC shadow cabinet members 
was apparently inaccurate. In the adversarial context, it was satisfying to explain to 
the court that an applicant had been refused for giving the ‘wrong’ answer, when in 
fact they were in the right.  
 
By the end of 2002, the nature of the appeals and the type of expert report required 
began to change. David Blunkett bowed to political pressures and promised that no 
Zimbabwean would be forcibly returned, even if their asylum claim had failed. The 
Home Office began to argue that most refugees from Zimbabwe were not at ‘specific’ 
risk from the political elite and should therefore return home. Part of the work of the 
country expert then was to explain the nature of the Zimbabwean state: not a failed 
 13 
 
state, but neither a totally dictatorial state in which every individual’s fate was 
determined from the centre. Again, detailed grassroots knowledge was needed here, 
alongside a general understanding of the workings of local and national state and 
party structures. But the emphasis was shifting away from minutiae of events, towards 
more general explanations of how political violence operated in different districts. 
 
Gradually, the battle between asylum seekers and the Home Office became more of a 
formalised contest, in which the ground-rules were clearly established. Asylum 
seekers were better prepared in interviews. It became known that applicants would be 
quizzed on their knowledge of the MDC, and that the accuracy of their answers would 
be assessed by civil servants using the ‘Country of Origin’ data on the Home Office 
web site as their guide. Applying for asylum became, like a driving test or a 
citizenship test, simply a matter of memorising the answers that were deemed to be 
‘correct’ (even where they were not!).18 At the same time, the Home Office assessors 
began to recognise that they needed a more sophisticated understanding of Zimbabwe, 
not least in order to avoid being exposed in expert advisors’ reports.  
 
For several years, certain categories of people were accepted as being at particular 
risk of political violence. Teachers and MDC activists in rural areas were more likely 
to be taken seriously than urban businessmen. Claims of MDC activism or police 
detention had to be supported by documentary evidence. Consequently, for some time 
the country experts were routinely asked to confirm the authenticity of such 
documents: something that I felt it was impossible for me to do. Instead, I focused on 
explaining the reasons why teachers and rural activists had been particularly targeted, 
and why these risks might still pertain. By this point, it was evident that country 
guidance was needed: there were clearly-defined forms of risk and categories of 
people at risk which were recurring in applications. 
 
In August 2006, a landmark CG case, ‘AA’, was decided. Prof Terence Ranger, who 
gave extensive expert evidence, noted that ‘AA’ was chosen as the CG case because 
the applicant had so little counting in his favour. He had come to the UK on a visitor’s 
visa, overstayed, and, when apprehended, had lied about his identity. He had failed to 
demonstrate any significant political activism in Zimbabwe, prior to his arrival in the 
UK. If this man could be granted asylum, then the parameters for eligibility for 
asylum would be clearly established. The case was difficult to resolve; in the 
meantime, a further CG case, ‘SM’, stated that teachers, MDC activists, and possibly 
returnees from the UK might be at greater risk. 
 
The determination from ‘AA’, when it finally appeared, was extraordinary. It stated 
that, if a person were deported to Zimbabwe having failed in an asylum application in 
                                                 
18 Jo Pettitt, Laurel Townhead, and Stephanie Huber, ‘The Use of COI in the Refugee Status 
Determination Process in the UK: Looking Back, Reaching Forward’, Refuge: Canada's Journal on 
Refugees, vol 25, no 2, 2008: 182-194 
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the UK, the very fact of having been in the UK and having made claims against the 
Zimbabwean government in pursuance of the asylum claim would, in itself, put that 
person at risk on return. All that a person needed to do to be eligible for asylum was 
actually to claim it! 
 
The nature of the work required from country experts changed significantly in the 
light of ‘AA’. It was no longer necessary to provide minute details of the location of 
youth militia camps and the patterns of political violence; nor to authenticate 
documents. The job now was to show a detailed knowledge of the procedures at all 
the entry points into Zimbabwe. The assumption was that a person was at greatest risk 
at the point of entering the country. How likely were they to be identified as a failed 
asylum seeker? I became familiar with Jane’s Defence Review, not a publication that 
I’d previously felt much need to read, which provided insider information about 
security service and army presence at airports and border posts.  
 
Another interesting area of expertise that came into demand after AA was ethno-
linguistic analysis. The Home Office began to suspect that people from other parts of 
southern Africa were claiming to be Zimbabwean to gain asylum under the liberal 
‘AA’ ruling. Chenjerai Shire, a linguist based at SOAS in London, was increasingly 
called upon to do a Professor Higgins-style analysis of origin, based on vowel sounds, 
lexical items and praise songs. 
 
The appeals against ‘AA’ led to a new CG case, ‘HS’, in November 2007. This rowed 
back from the very liberal ruling in ‘AA’ and reasserted that people must be political 
activists in order to be at risk under the terms of the international asylum conventions. 
It also indicated that the security service, the CIO, was monitoring the Zimbabwean 
communities in the UK and identifying people who were particularly active in 
opposition politics. These people, it was suggested, would be at specific risk if 
returned to Zimbabwe. 
 
Once again, the country experts were swung into action by the lawyers. A whole new 
area of expertise was required: could it be demonstrated that the applicant was active 
in the MDC in the UK? The attention moved away from defence reviews and 
ethnolinguistic analysis, and moved towards the myriad of websites, publications, 
schisms and meetings generated by MDC and MDC-linked organisations in the UK. 
Details of local branch membership, activities of local branches and the overarching 
importance of the Vigil outside Zimbabwe House in the Strand became essential 
information. It was at this time, too, that asylum applicants apparently recognised it 
was useful to build up an ‘activist profile’ in the UK before putting in a claim or 
appeal. 
 
Meanwhile, spiralling inflation, declining health services and the collapse of essential 
infrastructure allowed some lawyers to claim human rights (rather than asylum) 
ground for applicants to remain in the UK. I found that I had to enhance my 
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knowledge of Bill & Melissa Gates’ Global Fund; the sewerage systems in the high-
density suburbs; and the workings of international exchange rates. For one case, I had 
to research into successful businessmen who were also prominent MDC supporters, in 
order to expose a particularly mean-spirited refusal to a Bulawayo businessman. (The 
refusal said that he must be an economic migrant, because no MDC supporters were 
able to operated businesses in Zimbabwe). I ended up with an unexpectedly detailed 
knowledge of the dirty world of high-end schisms and betrayals around the 
boardrooms of Zimbabwe’s electronics and internet sectors. 
 
In early 2008, everyone held their breath, waiting to see what changes the election 
might bring. Expert advisors were gearing up for the possibility of being asked to give 
advice in appeals from Zanu-PF refugees coming to the UK to escape retribution 
following an MDC victory. As it turned out, the presidential election, the subsequent 
run-off election campaign and the eventual Global Political Agreement (GPA) 
dominated most of the year. The extremity of violence during the run-off campaign 
was incontrovertible and widely documented. By November 2008, a new Country 
Guidance case, ‘RN’, had been established in the UK, responding to the bloody ‘How 
did you vote?’ campaign. ‘RN’ was a very permissive ruling, which indicated that any 
Zimbabwean who could not demonstrate active support for Zanu-PF might be at risk 
on return. 
 
The ‘RN’ CG led to relatively straightforward cases and appeals. Unless an applicant 
or appellant actually had an unmissable history of being a Zanu-PF cadre, it was 
difficult not to be deemed eligible for asylum under ‘RN’. All that was asked of 
country experts was to confirm that the threat of extreme political violence which 
underpinned ‘RN’ – evidenced by the existence of youth militias, the lack of electoral 
reform, sporadic politically-motivated violence around the consultations for 
constitutional reform – was still in place. There were many other things happening in 
Zimbabwe under the new Government of National Unity that were much more 
positive. But the questions specifically posed by the lawyers did not ask us to 
comment on these.   
 
I began to notice, nonetheless, that many of the cases referred to me during the ‘RN’ 
period involved people who had been convicted of a crime while in the UK. Such 
people – many of whom had committed crimes because they were unable to earn a 
living without appropriate papers – could be deported as criminals, rather than as 
failed asylum seekers. Often, the lawyers were simply trying to assert that the claim 
for asylum should be heard at all, rather than appealing against a refusal. The 
permissiveness of the ‘RN’ ruling made it a propitious time to be attempting to make 
such a claim. 
 
On 10th March 2011, a new Country Guidance ruling for Zimbabwe was promulgated. 
This ruling – known as ‘EM and Others’ – makes it very much harder for 
Zimbabweans to argue for asylum in the UK. Whereas ‘RN’ defined anyone who 
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could not actively demonstrate support for Zanu-PF to be at risk, ‘EM and Others’ is 
much more restrictive and specific in defining categories of people who might be at 
risk, and even specifies categories of people who should not be deemed at risk.  
 
Unsurprisingly, given the history of CG cases for Zimbabwe, ‘EM & Others’ is 
already under challenge and leave has been given to appeal against it. However, in the 
year that it has been in place, it has already had a noticeable impact on the kinds of 
issues that country experts are asked to address. Everyone with whom I spoke agreed 
that two issues now dominate the reports they are asked to write: internal relocation 
options, and the details, timetable and progress of the GPA. The latter is easily 
explained by an observation in ‘EM & Others’ that: 
‘There is a considerable body of evidence to the effect that, if 
elections were to be held early at the instigation of Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF, in defiance of international opinion, there is a real risk of 
violence on the scale of 2008… In such a scenario (“the early 
election scenario”), a returning failed asylum seeker from the United 
Kingdom would face a situation in all essential respects akin to that 
identified by the Tribunal in RN.’19 
All reports are therefore now required to comment on the threat of early elections: a 
task perhaps made easier by the fact that a leading Zanu-PF spokesman has 
announced early elections almost every week since ‘EM & Others’ was issued. 
 
Internal relocation options, on the other hand, have opened up new areas of research, 
revolving primarily around social/cultural issues and requiring some engagement with 
anthropological literature. Internal relocation options were routinely discussed in 
country expert reports prior to ‘EM & Others’, because it is incumbent on applicants 
to demonstrate that this option is not available to them. However, the discussion was, 
in the past, fairly formulaic and cursory, relying on an explanation of the nature of the 
Zimbabwean state and its systems of registration and security service information 
networks. This changed with ‘EM & Others’ because the new CG specifically 
suggested that some parts of the country might be safe: 
(4) In general, a returnee from the United Kingdom to rural 
Matabeleland North or Matabeleland South is highly unlikely to face 
significant difficulty from ZANU-PF elements, including the 
security forces, even if the returnee is a MDC member or supporter... 
(5) A returnee to Harare will in general face no significant 
difficulties, if going to a low-density or medium-density area. Whilst 
the socio-economic situation in high-density areas is more 
challenging, in general a person without ZANU-PF connections will 
not face significant problems there (including a “loyalty test”), 
unless he or she has a significant MDC profile, which might cause 
him or her to feature on a list of those targeted for harassment, or 
would otherwise engage in political activities likely to attract the 
adverse attention of ZANU-PF. 
                                                 
19 EM and Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98(IAC), 10th March 2011, §241 
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(6) A returnee to Bulawayo will in general not suffer the adverse 
attention of ZANU-PF, including the security forces, even if he or 
she has a significant MDC profile.20 
Again, the situation has changed rapidly since the CG ruling was made. In some 
Harare high-density suburbs – notably Mbare, the oldest and best-known – there are 
very powerful youth militia groups, linked to Zanu-PF, who effectively control the 
districts. There is also Zanu-PF activity in Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South 
and Bulawayo. So part of the work now is to monitor the extent of this activity. 
 
However, alongside this research into specific geographic areas, there is also the 
question of how easy it is for someone to relocate. In particular, we are asked to 
comment on the problems faced by single women attempting to settle as returnees in 
areas with which they have no connection. The situation is very different from that 
facing the same women attempting to settle as asylum seekers in the UK. To explain 
this, we need to set out, in some detail, the complexities of how kinship networks and 
patronage systems work, and how fundamental these are for access to essential 
services and resources. Alongside information about politically-motivated sexual 
violence and gender-based violence more generally, our reports require a growing 
anthropological content.  
 
We wait to see what the challenge to ‘EM & Others’ will bring. It seems certain that it 
will throw up new issues in the ongoing tussles between lawyers and the Home 
Office. Country experts on Zimbabwe will once again have to move with the times, 
providing the information that delineates the specific features of the chessboard upon 
which the game takes place. Increasing numbers of such experts, it seems likely, will 
wish to withdraw from the process, as the situation on the ground becomes ever-more 
complicated and difficult to encapsulate within the adversarial asylum process. This 
survey illustrates that country expert reports cannot resolve the political and legal 
difficulties faced by asylum tribunals. They can, however, if treated kindly, provide 
an essential contribution to the picture: a contribution that is largely painted on the 
CG canvas. 
 
Diana Jeater, Visiting Research Fellow, Centre for African Studies, University of 
Oxford 
                                                 
20 EM and Others (Returnees), §267 
